In this paper we explore how platforms emerge and evolve due to independent actions by companies providing them or launching products on them. We use the software industry as the setting for our study. We analyze the pattern of evolution for Windows, Unix, and Linux over 14 years. Based on this, we derive some lessons for companies aspiring to compete in settings where platforms and complementors play a major role. We support our analysis using visualizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
As we shift away from the industrial age to a setting characterized by increasing reliance on information and communication technologies, new concepts become central to how companies craft their business strategies. Competencies are not limited to what a firm has inside, as can be seen when firms strive to complement their internal competencies with those of its alliances and partnerships. In such settings, the focus is no longer about competition between products, but about competition between platforms. For example: in the video-game sector, the competitive battle is not between Sony PS3 and Microsoft Xbox in terms of product features. It is between the PlayStation versus Xbox platforms, where the strength of the platform is based on the degree of third-party support that the platform enjoys via the availability of videogame titles that run on these platforms. So, Microsoft and Sony compete not just on the technical features that differentiate their consoles but also on their ability to orchestrate their network of third-party support. This is the emergent idea of platform-based competition that calls for innovation ecosystems [Adner 2006] .
In this paper, we argue that this type of competition is not limited to videogames but has relevance to many other industries, and that managers need to pay particular attention to understanding platform emergence and developing appropriate responses. [Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999] pointed out analytically that competition in the computer industry is between computer platforms with their associated network of complements. [Gawer and Cusumano 2002] described the lessons learned by companies such as Microsoft, Cisco and Intel that compete based on platforms. Using Intel as a case in point, Gawer and Henderson [2005] described how a platform provider chooses to enter complementary markets. These dynamic markets require an astute understanding of how platforms emerge and evolve through the interdependent actions of platform players and supporting component developers. What makes this particularly important is that the interactions are not static but evolve dynamically over time. By studying platforms in the software industry, we develop a set of implications for managers who may be finding their settings under transition to platform-based competition.
The software industry serves as an excellent setting to study platform emergence because of the rise, maturity, and fall of platforms such as Mainframe, Windows, Unix, and Linux over the last three decades. It is also timely because the rise of Linux as a viable alternative to Windows is not just due to the open source movement but also due to the support provided by firms such as IBM, HP, Sun, and Novell. To understand these software platforms, we observe and analyze the patterns of evolution of Windows, Unix, and Linux platforms and their associated ecosystems of third-party support over 14 years. Our choice of Windows recognizes its dominance over the last decade; our choice of Linux is because it is heralded as the platform of the future. We include Unix as it had a significant market share prior to Windows emerging as a dominant platform and shares many technical features with Linux. Although we study software platforms within the packaged software industry, our implications have broader applicability in setting such as the mobile devices, video games and automotive industry.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe software platforms and the role of complementors. In section 3, we describe our logic for visualizing software networks, and follow that with a description of the software industry as a network at five different points in time in section 4. In section 5, we present the network as seen from the perspective of a software stack. In sections 6 and 7, we draw some implications and identify some leading indicators to track. We end with conclusions in section 8.
II. ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE PLATFORMS
Software companies deliver a product that functions with complementary components from other companies to deliver business value. This calls for software companies to understand their positions within the ecosystem [Iyer, Lee et al. 2006] . Two dominant strategies emerge within the software sector: 1) they make their products as modules that subscribe to the architecture specified by another company (i.e., a platform provider); or 2) they seek to become a platform architect by gaining the support of complementary developers.
A platform is successful only if a set of complementors support it; this phenomenon is often referred to as network effects or system-based competition [Shapiro and Varian 1999; Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003] . The success of a platform can be seen through the interaction of two forces: the degree of acceptance and adoption by customers ( "customer network effects") and the availability of supporting software modules ( "complementary network effects"). Often, complementary network effects act as a lead indicator of the future success of a platform, although the network effects are highly interdependent. Research work done under the multi-sided market stream describes how platform owners can use differential pricing to promote network effects and adoption [Rochet and Tirole 2003] . By this logic, we should be able to see if a platform is viable by looking at the support it enjoys within the set of companies that design and deliver software products on a platform. [Venkatraman and Lee 2004] examined how network effects and other variables such as newness impacted a developer's platform adoption decision. They found that software developers were less likely to launch products on a platform when other developers already had a strong presence on the platform.
While we find information about sales to the end user of various platforms from the business press and analysts, we know very little about complementors that build software that works on top of these platforms. So, we began by looking at the data on the number of software products sold by companies supporting different platforms since 1990. Our analysis is based on data that has been collected by the International Data Corporation (IDC). Since 1990, IDC has systematically tracked the global software sales of more than 1,200 software companies. This database is widely considered the best source on the software industry; it has been used in the U.S. DOJ case against Microsoft and in academic research. The IDC database contains the global revenue generated by software companies at the level of products (e.g., SAS/Stat or PeopleSoft EnterpriseOne) for specific platforms. We excluded revenue from other sources (e.g., services) and focused on nine different platforms: We consider Unix, Linux, and Windows separately and aggregate the rest into "other." In effect, we focus on the network consisting of Unix and its variants (e.g., IBM's AIX, Sun's Solaris, and Hewlett-Packard's HP-UX), Windows and its variants (e.g., Windows 3.x, 32, and 64), and Linux.
Our first quest was to see how many companies offer software products on various platforms. Figure 1 indicates that there is a steady increase in the percentage of software companies supporting Linux. As of December 2004, nearly 21 percent of the firms in the software industry support Linux. Similarly, when we look at the Windows platform, we find that over 80 percent of the independent software vendors [ISVs] support the platform by having at least one product that runs on the platform. Unix, on the other hand, is seeing its support base gradually eroding. While it once enjoyed the support of nearly 80 percent of the independent software companies, today its share has been reduced to just over 60 percent. It is also clear from our analysis that most companies derive only a small percentage of their revenues from Linux. Windows [along with Unix], as expected, provides a big share of the revenue stream. We go further to explore how the network of complementors for the various platforms has evolved between 1990 and 2004. 100% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
III. ANALYZING THE NETWORK
In the U.S. DOJ case against Microsoft, a key contention was that Microsoft enjoyed applications barriers to entry. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson based his ruling against Microsoft on the claim that the company's monopoly in operating systems is protected by an applications barrier to entry made up of over 70,000 Windows-based software programs. As a result, to enter the operating-system market a newcomer would need a large and varied base of compatible applications like those available to consumers who might otherwise choose Windows. So, to understand platforms, we need to look at the network of complements supporting it.
While we can show the impact of complementary products using statistical techniques, we chose visualization for its explanatory power and ease of understanding. We build the network using the following components: software developer firms that build complementary products; platforms that provide the basis to build complements; and links that connect a platform to a firm. Firms are depicted as circles, platforms as squares, and links as lines. A link connects a firm to a platform if and only if the firm sells a product on that platform. When a firm sells products on more than one platform, a separate link is created to each platform. The size of the node indicates the total revenue of a software product company. The software company nodes are color-coded as follows: first time supporters of a platform are colored yellow; purple denotes companies that have supported the platform in previous years; and finally, magenta denotes firms that have yet to support the platform at that time. Platforms are represented by green squares. The size of the platform is based on the total revenue generated for that platform (a natural log transform of that).
Using Pajek network visualization software (http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/), we present a series of discrete-time images of the evolution of the software network. Pajek employs "spring-embedded" drawing algorithms to represent network data in two-dimensional Euclidian space. It has been recently used to model business networks [Venkatraman and Lee 2004; Powell, White et al. 2005] .
IV. VISUALIZING THE NETWORK OF PLATFORMS AND COMPLEMENTS
We present five network pictures representing the years 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 . Each picture captures the state of the network at that point in time and we discuss the evolution of the network in terms of how the platforms become dominant through supporting complements. If the platform has an increasing number of complementors, it is gaining in network effects. Similarly, if more complementors are dependent on the platform for a major percentage (100 percent if they support it exclusively) of their sales, the platform has greater staying power. 
V. MONITORING PLATFORM EMERGENCE THROUGH SUPPORT IN COMPLEMENTARY SOFTWARE STACKS
Thus far, we have treated the support from complementors as if they are all at the same level of abstraction in the information technology architecture. It is generally accepted that the computer industry has evolved from being vertically integrated to horizontal interconnections, which can be represented using four layers (See Figure 7) : services, application software, software operating systems, and hardware [Gerstner Jr. 2003; Gao and Iyer 2006] . Understanding platform emergence also calls for analyzing the pattern of support for a platform across these different layers which impact the basis of competition [West and Dedrick 2000] . Figure 7 . Software Stack
We used the layered model representation to further understand the degree of support for a platform. The visualizations show that mature platforms enjoy strong support from ISVs and complementary products that work within many layers of the stack. In Figure 8 , we depict the platform ecosystem based on the layer of the industry stack [Gerstner Jr. 2003; Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003 ] and the revenues generated for each layer. The picture for Windows shows that the platform enjoys widespread support for every layer of the stack. For Linux, support for the platform came from applications and systems software. Even for these, the support was symbolic as indicated by the links shaded green in color. During the same year, Unix enjoyed broader support across the stack and serious commitment from the ISVs as indicated by many links with yellow and a few with red shading. In addition, many layers of the stack are supported. However, while the prognosis for Linux is not encouraging, there are some characteristics reminiscent of how Windows emerged in the early 1990s. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The software industry is different from other industries because of the requirement of interdependence across different products. A platform succeeds because of the degree of network effects of complementors, which has been typically modeled analytically and/or statistically. In this paper, we have used network visualization to offer insights on the evolution of the software network to assess the growing importance of new platforms like Linux and the strong presence of incumbent platforms.
Our representation over time tells a compelling story. Mature platforms stay strong over the years. New platforms are not gaining traction, with ISVs only making symbolic commitments. If you look at the links to the Windows environment, you will notice a large set of exclusive links (represented in red), where these firms are "betting the farm" by developing products that run only on Windows. Viewing the pictures from the perspective of nodes, we notice that large companies such as IBM and SAP still hedge by supporting many platforms. Also, new entrants (shown in yellow) do not form exclusive links with any new platform: they hedge. Figure 1) , Linux may emerge as a platform due to possible nonlinear growth since in the networked economy, the network can tip at any time [Gladwell 2000 ].
VII. EARLY WARNING SIGNALS OF PLATFORM EMERGENCE BASED ON THE SOFTWARE SECTOR
Increasingly, managers may find themselves in platform-based competition. Here are some of the signals that we can discern based on the software sector.
1.
Is your industry facing platform-based competition? It is worthwhile to see if your industry has characteristics of the shift from vertical integration toward horizontal interconnected layers of functionality (Figure 7 ). When functionality is delivered by building on preexisting products, there is room for platform-based competition. One of the implications of the shift away from a vertically integrated, tightly controlled business architecture is the possibility of divided technical leadership. Just as Microsoft dominated with the Windows platform, Apple is striving to dominate the music industry through iTunes.
2.
Map platforms with links to key applications that support it. In some cases, the platform providers have the power while in other situations the power rests with critical application providers. An early example of this was the relationship between hardware vendors and operating system providers. IBM created the Wintel ecosystem but Microsoft ended up appropriating most of the value. And in the videogame sector, game software companies such as Electronic Arts are jockeying to get a greater share of the value because they have critical applications demanded by end users.
3.
Track the level of porting of applications across platforms. When software that is exclusive to a platform is ported to another, there is a significant shift in business power and leverage. SAP is trying to do this by supporting MySQL. Most of SAP's implementations support the Oracle database management system. By eroding Oracle's base within the database market, SAP is trying to stymie the progress of enterprise applications that Oracle is trying to sell to its database users.
4.
Watch for announcements from key industry players and entities to support specific platforms. IBM's announcement of one-billion-dollar commitment to Linux in 1999, or up to $20,000 for business partners to switch from Microsoft Exchange to Lotus on Linux in 2006 has galvanized the open-source software movement. They serve as lead indicators of competitive shifts among alternative platforms. Governments could also play roles in changing the competitive characteristics of platform-based competition.
5.
Incorporate platform thinking in dynamic terms through management dashboards. Current executive dashboards take real-time information from enterprise systems and look for anomalies or things that break a particular business rule. For example, companies may have a particular service level agreement with a vendor and the vendor will monitor delivery to conform to the agreements. As a result, dashboards are very good at tracking general process performance and in some cases companies have developed dashboards for verticals. What we have proposed here is a dashboard for strategic decision making. Such a dashboard should have the ability to render pictures like the ones depicted in this paper ( Figures  3, 4 , 5, and 6). These figures will help senior management from product companies to track competitors who launch products on their current platform or make substantive commitment to a competing platform. To get maximal insights from such networks, we recommend companies to make investment in decision support systems that will collect, organize and present information in the form of networks.
We hope our work stimulates companies to think in network terms using platforms and supporting complements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented the results of our analysis of the software industry. We find that firms can either be component providers that subscribe to a platform, or a platform provider that supports other component providers. Either way, firms have to be aware of the network effects. In particular, they should look for exclusive commitments, announcements by major vendors, porting solutions, and track these using dashboards. Our results apply to settings that are broader than the software industry. Today, in settings like mobile devices and automobiles, the product is dominated by software and the principles that we have identified apply. For example, when a product company plans to launch on a mobile device, they should first assess the operating platform that runs on the device. Having done that, they have to determine if other vendors are committed to it, and if so, how deep is the commitment. Based on this analysis, they have to make a strategic decision whether or not to adopt a platform.
